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Case No. 17754 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT CLUFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants brought this action to quiet 
title to them to certain disputed properties also claimed by 
defendants-respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the trial court sitting without 
a jury. The trial court quieted title in Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants to the parcel shown in green and marked by points 
W-X-Y-Z on Appendix A; quieted title in Defendants-Respondents 
Bigelow to the property shown in brown on Appendix A; and 
quieted title to Defendants-Respondents Cluff and Bigelow to 
the property cross-hatched in orange and designated by points 
P-M-N-0 on Appendix A. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent Cluff seeks to have the decision 
of the trial court affirmed in all respects. 
STATEMENT OE' FACTS 
The testimony for witnesses for both appellants and 
respondents show that there has been a long iriplaced fence 
running along lines shown in red on Appendix A and designated 
by letters Y-X-P-M, M-N and N-0 and its continuation to First 
South Street (R. 160-161) .. The property enclosed on three 
sides by the old fence has been occupied and used by the 
respondents and their predecessors in interest for over fifty 
years {R. 162-163, R. 211:6-12). The old fence line ran 
between the Cluff and Halladay properties on the west (R. 
/ 
161: 29 to 162: 5) , Points Y-M on Appendix A, and between the 
Cluff-Bigelow and Halladay' s properties on the north, Points 
M-N on Appendix A (R. 162, 168; R. 216:16-21; R. 202:13-18). 
The fence line on the west and north of the Cluff property was 
the continuation of a single fence in place for over 50 years, 
testimony of Elmo Halladay (R. 161:29-30; 162:18-21). No 
dispute had ever arisen between Defendant-Respondent Cluff and 
Plaintiffs-Appellants· regarding either the fence line on the 
west side or the fence line on the north side of the property 
occupied by the Cluf fs, testimony of Elmo ~alladay (R. 
163: 7-9), testimony of Plaintiffs-Appellants (R. 180 :11-17), 
testimony of Madge Cluff (R. 223:3-6). 
Madge Cluff purchased her property on the 11th of 
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March, 1948 (Ex. 18), which formerly belonged to her father, 
E·. G. Durnell (R. 214: 26-29). Thereafter, Defendant-Respon-
dent Cluff has occupied the property east of the fence line 
marked by points M-Y and south of the M-N fence line continu-
ously without interruption (R. 221: 25-28) • Defendant-Respon-
dent Cluff built a chicken coop upon said property in 1949 (R. 
217:17-19), dug a potato cellar on it (R. 218:8-12), placed a 
garden in it (R. 218: 18-23), and has continuously and exclu-
sively used the disputed (cross-hatched in orange on Appendix 
Ai) area since 1948 until the commencement of the lawsuit in 
this proceedings. At no time during that.occupancy has there 
ever been a dispute between the plaintiffs-appellants and the 
Defendant-Respondent Cluff over the boundary line between · 
their properties (R. 163:7-9, 221:25-28, 223:3-6). Defen-
dant-Respohdent Cluff occupied and acted with the understand-
ing that she had purchased the property to the north fence 
line (R. 216:15-18). However, the property actually described 
on the legal description of her Warranty Deed is offset ap-
proximately 50 feet south of the property occupied on the 
ground, giving Defendant-Respondent Cluff record title to the 
roadway but no record title to the north end of the property 
she occupied, testimony of Clyde Naylor (R. 137:6-26). 
The old fence line surrounding the Cluff/Bigelow 
properties on three sides was testified to by the older 
brother of the Plaintiff-Appellant Mack Halladay to be the 
dividing line between the property owned by Albert Halladay, 
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the father of Elmo and Mack Halladay, and the property of E. 
G. Durnell, the father of Madge Cluff (R. 162:28-30, 163:1-2). 
In 1951 Mayor George Collard obtained a tax deed to a 
parcel marked on Appendix A by points A B C and D and encom-
passing most of the disputed area. This tax deed which over-
lapped the Halladay properties produced a cloud upon the title 
to the Halladay properties, parcels 5, 6 and 7. In 1958 
plaintiffs-appellants obtained a conveyance of that tax title 
from Collard clearing off the overlapped description of the 
Collard property (Ex. 4, R. 173:10-11, 196:22-24). At no time 
between occupancy by Defendant-Respondent Cluff in 1948 and 
the commencement of this lawsuit did plaintiffs-appellants 
assert any title to the disputed area occupied by Defendant-
Respondent Cluff, as is born out of the testimony of Plain-
tiff-Appellant Mack Halladay (R. 180:11-17), the testimony of 
Elmo Halladay (R. 163:7-9, 168:9-17), the testimony of Defen-
dant-Respondent Madge Cluff (R. 221: 25-28) , and the testimony 
of Doug Cluff (R. 243:13-16). Neither Plaintiff-Appellant 
Mack Halladay, nor his father, predecessor in title, ever made 
or asserted any acts consistent with a claim of ownership on 
the disputed area (R. 228:3-10, R. 243:5-17, R. 246:4-7). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDAH.Y BY ACQUIESCENCE TO THE FACTS IN 
THIS CASE GIVING RISE TO THE DISPUTE IN THIS PROCEED-
ING 
One of the key cases establishing the guidelines for 
applicability for a boundary by acquiesence was the decision 
rendered by Justice Frick in 1906 in Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 
269, 87 Pac. 1009 (1906) where the Court said at page 281: 
• But in all cases where the boundary 
is open, and visibly marked by monuments, 
fences, or buildings, and is knowingly 
acquiesced in for a long term of years, 
the law will imply an agreement fixing the 
boundary as located, and will not permit 
the parties or their grantees to depart 
from such line. 
The Court went on to say at page 282: 
While the interests of society 
require that the title to real estate 
shall not be transferred from the owner 
for slight cause, or otherwise than by 
law, these same interests demand that 
there shall be stability in boundaries, 
and that, where parties have for a long 
term of years acquiesced in a certain line 
between their own and their neighbors' 
property, they will not thereafter be 
permitted to say that what they permitted 
to appear as being established by and with 
their consent and agreement was in fact 
false. 
In presenting the plaintiffs• case, plaintiffs called 
as their key witness plaintiff's older brother, Elmo Halladay, 
who is 70 years of age (R. 159: 8). He was a little over 20 
years old at the time he moved to the property (R. 162:13-15). 
He testified that the fence line marked on Appendix A by points 
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M-Y and the fence line marked on Appendix A by points M-N is a 
continuation of the fence line around the property formerly 
owned by Madge Cluff 's fath~r, Mr. Durnell (R. 162:3-4, 12-24) 
and was for the purpose of dividing the property line between 
the Halladays and the Durnells (Testimony of Elmo Hallawday, R. 
162:28-30; 163:1-2). 
In 1954, this Court, in Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah 
2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954}, quoted from its holding in Hummel 
v. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P.2d 410 (1953) stated at page 121 
as follows: 
We further pointed out in Brown v. 
Millner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2d 202 (1951) 
that in the absence of evidence that if 
the owners of adjoining property or their 
predecessors in interest ever made ex-
press parol agreement as to the location 
of the boundary between them if they have 
occupied their respective premises up to 
an open boundary line visibly marked by 
monuments, fences or buidings for a long 
period of time and mutually recognized it 
as the dividing line between them, the 
law will imply an agreement fixing the 
boundary as located, if it can do so 
consistently with the facts appearing and 
will not permit the parties nor their 
grantees to depart from such line., 
The Court then went on to indicate that the implica-
tion of boundary by agreement which is in fact referred to as 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence implies the agreement 
when such finding is consistent with the evidence. The Court 
referred the line of cases which followed Holmes v. Judge, 
supra, and commented at page 122: 
. . • In all those cases such an agreement 
could be implied without doing violence to 
the evidence appearing. 
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The Court then went on to show that the evidence in 
Ringwood v. Bradford, supra, as in the Hummel case showed that 
the installation of the fence was to include or exclude live-
stock and not as a boundary fence. Such finding precluded the 
application of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
In the Hummel case, as in the present 
case, there was evidence that the fence 
was intended to enclose or exclude live-
stock. Likewise, there was evidence, as 
here, that the person building the fence 
intended to build it upon his own land and 
hence did not consult his neighbor. Id. 
at 122 
In the case now before the Court, the evidence pre-
sented by the plaintiffs-appellants themselves is to the 
effect that the old fence line was for the purpose of dividing 
the Durnell-Cluff property from the Halladay property sur-
rounding it. 
In the 1963 case of King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 
378 P. 2d 893 (1963) the Court pointed out the basis in fact 
for the application of such boundary by acquiesence when it 
said at page 138: 
Since 1926, no one in the chains of title 
on either side ever questioned the old 
fence or the line which visibly was marked 
in whole or in part at times by a barn's 
wall, a wire fence, shrubs and a concrete 
driveway. From 1948 to 1961, Fronk res-
pected the line, and on uncontradicted 
testimony it seems evident that there was 
a visible boundary marked with monuments 
in 1926 that persisted without protest of 
any kind until 1961, when Fronk, in anti-
cipation of constructing an apartment 
house, questioned it for the first time. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The testimony of Mr. Halladay himself and that of his 
older brother shows that the old fence line was never ques-
tioned by the Halladays on the other side of the fence from 
1930 when they came to the property until the commencement of 
this lawsuit in 1979. Elmo Halladay said in response to 
plaintiffs' counsel's questions: 
Q: Did you ever speak with anybody about 
any kind of problem related to that fence 
line. 
A: No, we never had no problems then. We 
was always very good friends all the 
time. We was very good friends. 
Q: Are you aware of any conflict regard-
ing the fence line. 
A. None at all. (R. 163:3-9) 
On cross-examination Elmo Halladay said: 
Q: Now your dad occupied up to the fence 
line did he not? 
A: Right. Yes he did. 
Q: Did you not know that Mr. 
occupied and claimed to own the 
south of the fence line ..• 
Durnell 
property 
A: • I just know that he had a fence 
line there. I assumed that he did own it 
at that time, but I didn't kriow. (R. 
168:6-13) 
Q: Did you know that Mr. Durnell farmed 
that property? Did you know that he grew 





don't remember what they 
I knew he had a garden 
don't remember what they 
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Plaintiff-Appellant Mack Halladay testified: 
Q: Have you talked to Mrs. Cluff about 
this property or had any problems relating 
to this fence line? 
A: No I never had any problems with her, 
we never had any question over it. 
Q: Now what was the attitude toward that 
fence line? 
A: That was the property line. (R. 
180:11-17) 
Even Mack Halladay, the plaintiff-appellant who later 
purchased Parcel No. 1 on Appendix A attached hereto, testi-
f ied that when he purchased that property he intended to own 
the property up to the north fence line claimed by Bigelow and 
Cluff to be their north boundary line. When asked the ques-
tion: 
Q: When you bought the Boardman piece, 
did you not then intend to own to this 
north fence line? 
A: That is right. (R. 206:19-21) 
As pointed out in King v. Fronk, supra, at page 138, 
and at page 139: 
.a visible, persisting boundary having 
been shown over a long period of time is 
convincing evidence of an intended or 
acquiesced-in boundary. • it is incum-
bent upon him who assails it to show by 
competent evidence that a boundary was not 
thus established, ••• 
The visible boundary of ancient 
vintage and persistency of placement are 
the important aspects of the doc-
trine, ••• 
• • • What we assert is that the doctrine 
of 'boundary by acquiescence' looks to the 
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settling of title under circumstances 
where claimants, ex post facto, having 
slept on their claimed rights for a long 
period of time, presently assert those 
rights for one reason or another, 
including appreciation of values, 
un-neighborly relations, or because of an 
equity measured by th length of the 
Chancellor's foot, while insisting on 
ownership of property that an ancient 
boundary does not reflect or designate on 
the surface of the property. 
In this case, the plaintiffs-appellants claimed to 
have acquired title to the property including the disputed 
area covered by points A B C and D from Collards in 1958 and 
between that time and the commencement of this suit in 1979, 
their own admission is that they never had a dispute or as-
serted title to the property with Madge Cluff for a period in 
excess of twenty (20) years. They had not asserted title to 
the disputed property surrounded by that vintage fence from 
the time they came in to ownership in 1930 through the father 
of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, Mack Halladay, until the com-
mencement of this suit, a period of over 48 years. 
In this case the trial court applied the criteria 
pronounced in Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 
(1964) with specific findings as to each of the four elements 
set forth therein. The Court went on to explain that the 
intervention of the tax title deed from Collard to Halladays 
covering parcel A B C and D is readily explained as a means by 
which Halladays cleared off the title to their property sur-
rounding the disputed area on three sides and to which they 
held undisputed title by the securing. That tax title convey-
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ance had created a cloud on their title which was cured by 
securing the conveyance from Collard. 
In 1978 this Court speaking in Florence v. Hiline 
Equipment Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978), said at page 1000: 
It is well established that if adjoining 
landowners occupy their respective premises 
up to a certain line which they mutually 
recognize and acquiesce in for a long 
period of time, the true boundary being 
unknown, they are precluded from claiming 
that the boundary line thus recognized and 
acquiesced in is not the true one. 
In that case the Court then went on to point out that 
both of the parties on the respective sides of the fence line 
knew of the true boundary line between their properties and 
did not by their actions rely upon the fences as being the 
true and actual boundary line. 
The testimony now before the Court is just the oppo-
site, the parties here and their predecessors in title have 
always considered and dealt with that old fence line as being 
the boundary of their respective properties. The testimonies 
of Madge Cluff, Elmo Halladay and Mack Halladay show that as 
to the parcel the trial court quieted in the Halladays shown 
on Appendix A in green and lying west of the vintage fence 
line, they always considered the fence line as the boundary 
line despite the fact that the true title line of the Halladay 
parcel 5 did not even reach over to the title line of the 
Cluff property. The portion of the Cluff property lying west 
of the old fence line was only considered by the Cluff' s and 
the Halladays to be the Halladay' s property. The Halladays 
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apparently were not aware of the fact that their title line 
left a no man's land between the title line of Cluff and the 
title line of Halladay. They occupied that area pursuant to 
the same doctrine of boundary by acquiesence. In virtually 
identical fashion, the Halladays acquiesced for many years in 
the north boundary of the Cluff property being the old M-N 
fence line by visiting with the Cluffs over the fence without 
any assertion of a claim of ownership. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that the measuring 
period of time should not be less than 20 years measured from 
their 1958 acquisition of the Collard tax title. However~ in 
Hales v. Frakes, Utah, 600 P.2d 556 (1979) the Court used as a 
basis for application of the doctrine the installation of 
fence line by the predecessors in interest of the defendant. 
The Court re-examined the criteria relative to boundary by 
acquiesence and quoted from Brown v. Mulliner, 120 Utah 16, 
232 P.2d 202 (1951) at page 558: 
where the boundary is open, and visibly 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, 
and is knowingly acquiesced in for a long 
term of_years, the law will imply an agree-
ment fixing the boundary as located. 
Holmes v. Judge, at 87 P.1014. 
In Hales v. Frakes, supra, the Court said that the 
trial court had found that the fence was erected as a barrier 
to control livestock, not as a boundary, and was purposely 
offset so as to be south of an expected road. Thus the proper 
application of boundary by acquiesence under that set of facts 
was to hold that it had not been established. 
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In the case now before the Court the trial court 
properly applied boundary by acquiesence. By the plaintiffs-
appellants' own testimony, it was clear that the fence was a 
dividing line between the adjoining property owners. The 
trial court also took into account the recent decision of 
Victor Brown, et al. v.. Peterson Development Co., et al., 
Utah, 622 P.2d 1175 (1980) where the Court said at page 14: 
It is clear from the undisputed evidence 
that plaintiffs and their predecessors in 
title and interest had occupied, possessed 
and used the land included in the disputed 
strip for more than 40 years as the owners 
thereof; that the land had been bounded by 
a visible fence during all that time, 
which fence had been accepted by the 
adjoining landowners as the boundary line 
between their respective tracts of land. 
The Court held that the title marked by the old fence 
line had established, prior to the more recent events, a 
boundary by acquiesence that could not be overcome by the mere 
naked title. In the memorandum decision of the trial court, 
Appendix "B", which was encompassed in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision (R. 46-49), the trial court 
took into account and made specific findings: 
(a} The plaintiffs have never occupied the 
area cross-hatched in orange on Exhibits 8 and 12. 
{b) The fence line identified on said exhibits 
(8 & 12) as points P-M-N-0 have existed for a long 
period of time and have marked the boundaries of 
occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow and 
their predecessors in interest since before 1948. 
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(c) That during said period said defendants 
and their predecessors have built improvements upon 
said land, occupied it for purposes of farming, 
storage and business operations. 
(d) The M-N fence line has been there for over 
fifty (50) years. 
(e) The only evidence of plaintifts' claim of 
ownership to the disputed area was an incident 
occurring between the plaintiffs and the defendant, 
Bigelow, in 1977 or 1978. 
(f) The trial court's visit to the premises 
disclosed that a well developed fence line and 
planted area marking that as the area of occupation 
as between the plaintiffs' property on the north and 
defendants' property on the south. 
(g) Possession of the disputed grounds was in 
the defendants as to the date of viewing and as the 
facts were shown over the years by the witnesses 
called and the other documentary evidence including 
photographs, that were submitted. 
(h) Neither the tax title limitations statutes 
nor the succeeding to legal title by tax deed cut 
off defendants' claims to title by acquiescence to 
the property within the fences described as M-N-0-P. 
(i) The trial court concluded that Brown v. 
Peterson Development Co., supra, would support the 
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trial court's view that legal title can be defeated 
by acquiescence as above-set forth. 
(j) The acquisition of the tax title from 
Collard indicates that there were other disputes 
relative to the boundaries of plaintiffs' land. 
Plaintiffs contend that the purchase of the tax 
title deed from George Collard in 1958 created a new factual 
situation disallowing the application of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. If such be the case, it is ex-
tremely strange that plaintiffs would have claimed an owner-
ship in the disputed area from 1958 to 1979 when this lawsuit 
was commenced without ever communicating such ownership claim 
to the Cluffs, who were occupying the disputed area for that 
21 year period as shown by Mack Halladay's own testimony. 
The trial court correctly held that the intervention 
of the tax deed did not defeat the boundary by acquiescence 
that had been established since before 1948, and by the testi-
mony of Elmo Halladay had in fact been occupied by the 
adjoining parties since 1930. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, being fully advised in all the 
factual circumstances alluded to from the record in this 
brief, and being fully aware of the respective claims of the 
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parties, correctly applied the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent Cluff were mailed to S. Rex Lewis of 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Attorneys for Respondent Bigelow, at 
P. O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603, and to Brent D. Young of 
Ivie & Young, Attorneys for Appellants, P. O. Box 672, Provo, 
Utah 84603t by placi~g the same in the u. S. Mails, postage 
prepaid, this 5th day of April, 1982. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 





PERRY K. BIGELOW and 
NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Civil Case No. 53,243 
D E C I S I 0 N 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 28th day 
of August, 1980, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for the plaintiffs, 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant Cluff, ands. Rex 
Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants Bigelow. The parties pre-
sented their evidence and after having presented final arguments 
to the Court on the facts and the law the Court took the matter 
under advisement, and having fully considered same, now enters its: 
D E C I S I 0 N 
The Court finds that the plaintiff·s Halladay have succeeded 
in establishing their title to the property in Parcel 3 owned by 
Cluff on Exhibit 12 which is cross-hatched in green, by virtue of 
title by acquiescence, and that the occupancy of Halladay meets the 
requirements of Utah decisional law as announced in Fuoco v. Williams, 
15 Utah 2d 156, and Hales v. Frakes, 600 P. 2d 556. 
The Court also finds that defendants Biglow have established 
title to that strip of land within legal title of plaintiffs 
Halladay on Exhibit 12 as Parcel 1 which is cross-hatched in brown 
on the basis of boundary by acquiescence and title to said property 
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As to the property in controversy between plaintiffs, 
Cluff and Bigelow cross-hatched in orange on said Exhibit 12, 
the Court finds that the plaintiffs succeeded to a tax title 
which encompansses most of the area in controversy and is shown 
as outlined in yellow on the aforesaid Exhibit No. 12. 
The tax title was issued to George E. Collard by Utah 
County on the 23rd day of May, 1951, and recorded June 28, 1951 
in the Off ice of the Utah County Recorder. This document is 
Defendants' Exhibit 27. The tax deed is regular on its face 
and can not be challenged by the defendants herein since the 
Statutes of Limitations has run against such a challenge. 
The Court finds that the plaintiffs have never occupied 
the area cross-hatched in orange on Exhibits 8 and 12, and that 
the fence lines identified on said exhibits as point P-M-N-0 
have existed for a long period of time and have marked the boundaries 
of occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow and their predeces-
sors in interest since before 1948, and that during said period 
said defendants and their predecessors have built improvement~ 
upon said land, occupied it for purposes of farming, storage, 
and business operations, all as testified to by the witnesses 
called by said defendants, Madge Cluff Kelson, Douglas Cluff, 
Roy Kelson, Reed Kelson, Perry Bigelow. Elmo Halliday testified 
that the M-N fence line has been t~ere for o~er SO years. 
p.4.-.i:.:~({4 >~L- . 
The only evidence of the~claim of ownership and title 
to the tract in dispute (orange cross-hatch) was an incident 
occuring in 1977 or '78 when the plaintiffs asserting title thereto 
ordered defendant Bigelow to cease digging a potato cellar thereon. 
The defendant moved his digging· back to within his legal title 
ground, although he testified he did not acknowledge plaintiffs' 
superior right to the land in dispute. 
The Court visited the premises and in viewing the north 
boundary of the land in dispute concluded that a well-developed 
fence line and planted area marking that as the area of occupation 
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as between the plaintiffs' property on the north and the defendants' 
property on the south, and that possession of the disputed grounds 
was in the defendants as of the date of viewing and as the facts 
were shown over the years by the witnesses called and the other 
documentary evidence including photographs that were submitted. 
It is further noted that there is no record title in either 
defendants for the property in dispute. The defendants' legal 
title for their north boundaries is along a line approximately from 
Point P to Point O on said Exhibits 12 and 8. • 
From the foregoing the Court concludes that neither the tax 
title limitations statutes nor the succeeding to legal title by a 
~,(,,.. 
tax deed tr d!iiill£. cut off defendants' claims to title by acquiescence 
to the property within the fenc es described as M-N-0-P o~ Exhibits 
8 and 12. In this respect defendants have established: 
1. Occupation by defendants and their pre-
decessors in interest up to a visible line marked 
definitely by fences and other visible monuments, 
and, 
2. Acquiescence in the line as the boundary, 
3. For a long period of years, 
4. By adjoining landowners. 
The above-cited cases of Fuoco v. Williams and Hales v. 
Frakes support these conclusions from the facts of this case. 
The recent case of Brown v. Pe~erson Development Compain:_L Supreme 
Court No. 16785, would support the Court's view that legal title 
can be defeated by acquiescence as above-set forth. 
I' 
It is further noted by the Court that the acquisition of title 
by plaintiffs through the tax deed to Collard of May, 1951, includes 
a twenty-foot strip within Halladays' chain of title to Parcel 7, and 
is evidence that there were other disputes relative to boundaries 
which would attempt to l~ssen the possibility of claims being made 
north of the fence line in question to which plaintiffs had a 
separate chain of title not based on the tax sale. 
-3-
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Counsel for defendants are directed to prepare Findings of 
Fact, conclusions of Law and Decree quieting title in the plaintiffs 
for the areas above-set. forth, and in the. defendants Bigelow for that 
portion of Parcel 1 cross-hatched in brown and in both defendants 
Cluff and Bigelow for the portion Tract No. 4 cross-hatched in 
orange and as defined by the surveys otherwise contained in the 
exhibits admitted in this matter. The same are to be submitted 
to counsel for plaintiffs for his approval as to form and then to 
the Court for signing and~entry herein. 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah this ~day of November, 
1980. 
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